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STATEMENT OP ISSUES FOR APPEAL
ARE PLAINTIFFS DAKAL AND DIVERSIFIED BONA
FIDE PURCHASERS OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY?
ISSUE ONE:
Dakal

and

Is the Trial Court's ruling that Plaintiffs

Diversified

had

actual

notice

of

American's

prior

adverse interest in the subject property supported by a quantum of
evidence sufficient to withstand appellate review?

ISSUE TWO:

Similarly, did the evidence presented to the

Trial Court support a finding that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy
their duty of inquiry?
ABBREVIATED FORMS
To facilitate review and the treatment of the issues presented, the following terms will be used throughout this brief and
accorded the meanings as follow:
1.

American—Defendant/Respondent American Savings & Loan

Association.
2.

Dakal—Plaintiff/Appellant Dakal, Inc.

3.

Diversified—Plaintiff/Appellant

4.

F £—refers to the numbered paragraph of the Findings of

Diversified

Equities,

Inc.

Fact portion of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law rendered by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick.

5.

C £—refers to the numbered paragraph of the Conclusions

of Law portion of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law rendered by the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick.
6.

T

£, L

#—refers to the page and line of the trans-

cript of the hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick held
on the 19th day of April, 1984.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE:
Plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal brought this action at law

to quiet title to certain property located in the County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah, in behalf of Diversified, subject to an equitable lien in favor of Dakal (Official Record, pp. 2-11).
B.

PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT:
This

appeal

arises

from

the

judgment

rendered

by

the

Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on the 23rd of July, 1984. Therein,
the Court found that neither Diversified nor Dakal were bona fide
purchasers of the subject property; refused to quiet title in
Diversified? and, quieted title in Dakal subject to an equitable
lien in favor of American equal to the amount of unpaid principal
and arrearages due and owing (Official Record, pp. 286-291).
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Respondent is in substantial agreement with facts as stated

in Appellants1 Brief.

To avoid needless duplication of effort,
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Respondent declines to make a statement of facts (as allowed by
Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proceduref effective
Januaryf 1985).

Where Respondent has found it necessary to sup-

plement or enlarge on the facts given in Appellants1 brief, it has
done so in the text of its argument.

Any supplemental facts are

appropriately identified and indexed to their source (transcripts,
findings, conclusions, or depositions).

SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
I.

It is unclear from the Appellants' brief submitted here-

in by counsel which of the Plaintiffs said counsel represents.
Also, said brief is confusing and inconsistent as to which remedy
each of the Appellants is seeking from this Court.
II.

Defendant/Respondent American Savings and Loan Associ-

ation contends that the burden of proof that a party was a bona
fide purchaser of the subject property lies with the Appellant
seeking to quiet title in the subject property.
III.

The issues raised by Appellants

in their appeal are

issues of fact which are subject to very limited review by this
Court and any competent evidence which supports or infers support
for the trial court's findings will uphold the findings of a trial
court on questions of fact.
A.

Respondent submits that this action to quiet title

is an action at law and therefore appellate review is limited
to questions of fact.
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B.

If this Court determines

that

the

instant case

represents an action at equity, then the trial court's decision should be upheld unless the evidence clearly preponderates against its findings.
IV.

In any event, the evidence presented at trial overwhel-

mingly supports the trial court's findings and conclusions that
neither Diversified Equities, Inc. nor Dakal, Inc. are bona fide
purchasers

of

the

subject

property

because

they

had

"actual

notice" of Respondent's security interest in the subject property.
V.

Also, because Appellants Diversified Equities, Inc. and

Dakal, Inc. did not satisfy their duty of inquiry once they had
actual notice of Respondent's interest in the property, Appellants
are not bona fide purchasers.
ARGUMENT
I.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF AND THE REMEDIES SOUGHT
THEREIN ARE CONFUSING AND UNCLEAR.

Appellants' Brief, in several respects, is confusing and
unclear as to which of the Appellants' positions it advocates. It
is American's knowledge and belief that the law firm of Mooney &
Smith represents both Diversified and Dakal.
natively

lists itself as attorney

Yet, counsel alter-

for Plaintiff/Appellant

and

attorney for Plaintiff^s/Appellants* on the face sheet of its brief.
Arguments presented by Appellants' brief are in behalf of
only Dakal (see arguments listed in Appellants' Table of Contents
p. ii).

In addition, the relief sought on appeal, as it appears
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in Appellants' Brief at page 1 and 2 cleatly asks for independent
and inconsistent relief for both parties.
Diversified prays that the judgment of the trial court be
reversed and that its rights in the subject property be upheld.
Although this is unclear, Respondent assumes that the rights which
Diversified seeks to uphold are those prayed for in its Complaint.
The prayer clause of the Complaint is stated as follows:
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows (a)
quieting title in the name of Plaintiff Diversified
Equities, Inc., subject only to the lien of Dakal, Inc.
to the subject property; (Official Record, p. 4)
Dakal, on the other hand, prays in Appellant's Brief, page 2,
that the trial court's judgment be reversed and that Dakal be
declared the owner of the subject property in fee simple, free and
clear of any interest whatsoever in American Savings & Loan.
inconsistencies

and alternate positions adopted

The

by Appellants'

Brief makes it difficult or impossible for American to know how to
respond to the Brief.
As noted above, Appellants' Brief, to the best of American's
knowledge, seeks independent and inconsistent remedies.

American

contends that Appellants may not seek inconsistent remedies on the
basis of a single combined brief.

Common sense demands that a

single brief can only logically support one position.

This fact

is illustrated by the unilateral nature of the arguments presented
in the Brief (argument is in behalf of only Plaintiff Dakal).
Although, Rule 24(i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
allows multiple appellants to join in a single brief, the Rule
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^oes not allow inconsistent remedies to be sought in a single
brief.

Appellants' innovative procedural posture prejudices Amer-

ican.

It is difficult, or at best burdensome, for American to

respond to the Brief in its present form.
Appellants' request for inconsistent remedies also creates a
clear conflict of interest between Dakal and Diversified.
adverse

interests of Dakal

and

Diversified

make

The

it extremely

doubtful that they can be adequately represented by the same counsel.

Disciplinary Rule 5-105(B) of the Utah Rules of Professional

Conduct states:
(B) A Lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if
the exercise of his independent professional judgment in
behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely
affected by his representation of another client . . . .
On the basis of Appellants' Brief, American believes that counsel
may not represent both Dakal and Diversified in this matter.

II.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO MEET THEIR
BURDEN OF PROOF IN ESTABLISHING THEMSELVES AS BONA FIDE PURCHASERS.

Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified have emasculated the issue
of burden of proof in their brief by citing Ash v. State, 572 P.2d
1374 (Utah 1977).
p.

Ash v. State is cited in Appellant's Brief at

10 for the proposition

that Plaintiffs, in a quite title

action, have only the initial burden of going forward to prove a
prima facie case.

Once accomplished, the burden then shifts to

the Defendant to overcome title shown in Plaintiff.
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Although the

proposition, as stated, is generally true, it is cited in a misleading context.

The specific issue in the present case is not

the burden of proof in a quiet title action; rather, the issue is
the burden of proof in establishing one's status as bona fide purchaser.
Plaintiffs' citation of Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah
1983), is also misleading.

They cite the case, apparently, for

the proposition that a prior unrecorded interest holder has the
burden of proof in establishing that a subsequent purchaser had
actual notice.

This proposition is, again, correct in the proce-

dural context of Johnson v. Bell; the same is not true in the
present action.

In Johnson the prior unrecorded interest holder

claimed that subsequent purchasers were not bona fide by bringing
an action to quiet title.

Therefore, the burden was correctly

allocated to the Plaintiff to prove that subsequent purchasers
were not bona fide purchasers.

In the present action Dakal and

Diversified have claimed that title should be quieted
because they are bona fide purchasers.

in them

Therefore, it is incumbant

on them to prove the necessary elements of that status.
The Oregon Supreme Court in Nelson v. Hughes, 625 P.2d 643,
645-650 (Or. 1981), thoroughly and authoritatively analyzed the
burden of proof in the context of establishing the status of bona
fide purchaser.
present case.

The facts of the case are similar to those of the
Plaintiff, a subsequent purchaser, moved to quiet

title in itself as against a prior unrecorded interest holder.
After a lengthy treatment of the policies behind allocating proof
and the precedents in Oregon, the Court concluded that the Plain-

-7-

tiff should bear the burden of proof for establishing its status
as a bona fide purchaser.

In reaching this conclusion, the Oregon

Court relied on several policy factors.

In cases where a plain-

tiff/subsequent purchaser attempts to avail itself of the protections afforded to bona fide purchasers in a quiet title action,
the following factors indicate that the plaintiff should bear the
burden of proof.

(1) The plaintiff is more likely able to produce

such evidence; (2) The existence of the facts is essential to
plaintiff's case; (3) The application of the statute is essential
to the plaintiff's right of recovery; (4) The burden should be
borne by plaintiff because the basic statutory policy of protecting persons withih a statutory classification is furthered; and
(5) The burden should be imposed upon the party who pleads the
facts necessary to establish bona fide purchaser.

Nelson at 645-

646.
In Nelson, the Court considered whether the policy of the
recording statute would be advanced by shifting the burden of
proof.

The Court held that the plaintiff in that case bore the

burden of pleading and proving facts essential to being a bona
fide

purchaser.

The

Court

based

its

opinion

on

reasoning

reflected in an early New Jersey case.
I confess that to my mind the language of the statute
indicates no shifting of the burden of proof.
The
unrecorded instrument is not made invalid generally; it
is made invalid only as to certain classes of persons . . . . Logically, therefore, it would seem that
one in order sucessfully to claim the benefit of the
statutory provision must bear the burden of proving himself to be within the class of persons as to whom, only,
the contract is declared invalid. McVoy v. Baumann, 93
N.J. Eq. 360, 117A. 717, 723. Cited in Nelson at 647.
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The Oregon statute cited is identical to the Utah statute.
Although not controlling, the reasoning is applicable and persuasive.

American's unrecorded interest is made invalid only to bona

fide purchasers.

Therefore, it is reasonable to require Dakal and

Diversified to prove that they fall within the statutory classification of bona fide purchaser.
reasoning

and

result

reached

Therefore, consistant with the
by the Oregon

Supreme

Court

in

Nelson, Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified should be required to not
only plead, but also prove their status as bona fide purchasers.
The record and the decision of the trial court clearly illustrate
that Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden.
III.

PLAINTIFFS1 ISSUES UPON APPEAL ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT AND AS SUCH, ARE SUBJECT
TO VERY LIMITED APPELLATE REVIEW.

Plaintiffs' first issue is whether Dakal and Diversified, as
purchasers, received actual notice of American's prior interest in
the subject property.

The Utah Supreme Court, in a recent case,

confirmed that the determination of whether a purchaser received
actual notice of prior unrecorded interests is a question of fact.
Johnson v. Bell, supra.

In Johnson, Plaintiffs Verl and Mary

Johnson were grantees under a Quit Claim Deed to 80 acres located
in Tooele County.

Prior to the time the Johnsons recorded their

Quit Claim Deed the grantor, Milton Bell, executed a Trust Deed on
the 80 acres to Murray First Thrift & Loan.

The trial court found

that Murray First Thrift, as trustee of the Trust Deed, did not
have actual notice of the plaintiffs' interest in the property.
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In upholding the decision of the trial court, the Supreme
Court stated:
Whether Murray First had actual notice was a question of
fact which the Plaintiffs had the burden of proving.
The trial court did not error in ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case that
Murray First Thrift had actual notice as required by
Section 57-1-6 [Utah Code Annotated], Johnson at 310.
(Emphasis added.)
Other jurisdictions within the Pacific Region are in accord with
this position.

Bailey v. Ewing, 671 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Idaho App.

1983); Pflueger v. Hopple, 156 P.2d 316, 318 (Idaho 1945); Saxon
v. Dubois, 209 Cal. App. 2d 713, 26 Cal. Rptr. 196, 200; Peterson
v.

First National Bank of Lander, 579 P.2d

1978).

(See 66 CJS Notice § 22, pp. 675-676.)

Plaintiffs second
duty of

1038, 1041 (Wyo.

inquiry was

issue, the determination of whether the
satisfied,

is also

a question

of fact.

Although the Utah Court has apparently not ruled on this issue,
the general trend of legal authority characterizes this issue as a
question of fact.

G. Thompson, 8 Thompson on Real Property, §4236

at p. 451 (1963).

Other jurisdictions within the Pacific Reporter

Region have also ruled that this inquiry is a question of fact.
U.S. Fiduciary Corp. v.
(Ariz.

Loma Vista Associates, 675 P.2d 724, 728

App. 1983), (whether due inquiry was made is a question

of fact); Berge v. Fredericks, 591 P.2d 246, 249 (Nev. 1979), (the
question whether due inquiry was made is one of fact to be investigated by the jury).
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A.

THE PRESENT ACTION TO QOIET TITLE IN
DAKAL AND DIVERSIFIED IS AN ACTION AT
LAW; THEREFOREf APPELLATE REVIEW IS
LIMITED TO QUESTIONS OF LAW.

The scope of appellate review in Utah is influenced by two
interrelated factors.

The distinction between questions of law

and questions of fact is decisive of the appropriate standard of
review.

This distinction produces different results depending

whether it arises in an action at law or at equity.

The law/

equity distinction has constitutional implications on the scope of
appellate review.

The scope of appellate review is addressed by

the Utah Constitution in Article VIII, Section 9:
From all final judgments of the district court, there
shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The
appeal shall be upon the record made in the Court below
and under such regulations as may be provided by law.
In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both
law and fact; in cases at law, the appeal shall be on
questions of law alone. (Emphasis added.)
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted this constitutional provision in Christiansen v. Utah Transit Authority, 649 P.2d 42, 45
1982).

There, the court enunciated the precise scope of appellate

review which would be accorded to cases at law.
The Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 9,
limits our review in cases at law to questions of law
and thus we will not disturb a jury verdict on a factual
question which is supported by any competent evidence.
Uinta Pipe Line Corporation v. Superior Co. , 546 P.2d
885 (Utah 1976); Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah
1975); Christiansen at 45. (Emphasis added.)
The Supreme Court's review of questions of fact raised on appeal
from actions at law, therefore, is limited to a determination of
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whether any factual support exists in the record for the finding
made by the trial court.
A concrete example of the operation of this standard of
review is found in Pixton v. Dunn, 120 Ut. 658, 238 P.2d 408 (Utah
1951).
false

In that case, Plaintiff brought an action to recover for
arrest

and

imprisonment.

Plaintiff and Defendant appealed.

The

trial

court

found

for

In addressing the issue of

whether the facts were sufficient to support the findings of the
trial court, the Supreme Court stated:
[The facts] are sufficient if the circumstances developed by the Plaintiff would support an inference that
the Defendant was the directing or instigating force of
the illegal arrest. Pixton at 408.
Therefore, any competent evidence which supports or infers support
for the trial court's findings is sufficient to uphold the findings of a trial court on questions of fact.
Having

determined

the

appropriate

standard

of

appellate

review for questions of fact in actions at law, it remains only to
determine whether the present action is indeed an action at law.
Historically, an action
equitable in nature.

to quiet

title was

considered

to be

Utah courts have long since discarded this

distinction based on historical origin.

Utah case law during the

last century has consistently held that a quiet title action is an
action at law.
The precise issue raised here, whether a quiet title action
is an action at law for the purposes of determining the scope of
appellate review, was decided by the Utah court in Dahnken v.
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George Romney & Sons Co., 111 Ut. 471, 184 P.2d 211 (1947).

In

Dahnken, the Plaintiff brought an action td quiet title to a strip
of land at the rear of his property.

Defendants appealed from a

judgment quieting title in Plaintiff,

Th^ Court stated that the

quiet title action was an action at law involving legal issues and
therefore,

"[0]ur

review

in

law

cases

is

limited

to

the

determination of whether or not there is competent evidence to
support the judgment of the trial court."

Dahnken at 215.

Additionally, the Supreme Court has found quiet title actions
to be actions at law in the context of determining a parties'
right to a jury trial.

Norback v. Board of Directors, Etc. 37

P.2d 339, 343 (1934); Babcock v. Danqerfi^ld, 98 Utah 10, 94 P.2d
862, 863 (1939); and Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 P.2d
250, 251 (1958).
The precedents in Utah, as cited above, dictate that the present quiet title action be considered an Action at law.

The fact

that the present action involves some eqijitable issues and remedies does not, per se, convert the present action to an action at
equity.

In Norback, supra, the trial ccjmrt refused Plaintiff's

demand for a jury trial because it believed the presence of equitable issues in the case converted it to an equity action.
Utah Supreme Court overruled the trial court stating:
If the issues are legal or the major jissue legal, either
party is entitled upon proper demand to a jury trial;
but, if the issues are equitable or the major issues to
be resolved by an application of equity, the legal issue
being merely subsidiary, the action should be regarded
as equitable and the rules of equity apply. Citations
omitted. Norback at 345. (Citations ,omitted.)
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The

imilarly, the major issues involved in the present action
are

legal

in nature.

pleadings

presented

equitable

relief

was

by

This

fact may

both

parties.

granted

in

the

be

ascertained

Also,
trial

the

court

by the

fact

that

memorandum

decision does not disturb the status of this case as an action at
law.

In the Norback case, the Court opined:
Where the issues are legal issues, the fact that equitable relief may be plead for, to carry into effect the
judgments based upon the legal issues, "is not sufficient to deprive either party of his right to have the
legal issues submitted to a jury."
Citation omitted.
Norback at 343.
The present action is by nature and by weight of precedent an

action at law.

The fact that some equitable issues or equitable

remedies are involved does not change the basic nature of this
case.

The standard of appellate review for questions of fact in

actions at law, as defined in Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah
Constitution and judicial interpretations thereof, is to ascertain
whether any evidence exists that supports or infers the result
reached by the trial court.

This is the appropriate standard of

review for the issues of actual notice and adequacy of inquiry
which Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified

have raised on appeal.

When the facts and evidence presented

to the trial court are

reviewed under this liberal standard, the decision below should be
upheld.
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B.

IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT T&E PRESENT
CASE IS ACTUALLY AN ACTION AT EQUITY, THEN
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION WILL BE UPHELD
UNLESS THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES
AGAINST ITS FINDINGS.

Although the Utah Supreme Court's statements concerninq the
standard of review for findings of fact in equity cases have been
somewhat varied, the standard most commonly given is that reversal
is merited only when the evidence clearly preponderates against
the findings of the trial court.

Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d

478, 479 (Utah 1981); Peterson v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329, 330 (Utah
1978); and, Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1975).

A

good explanation of this standard of revi,ew is found in Nokes v.
Continental Mining and Milling Company, 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P.2d
954.
[T]he finding of the trial court will not be disturbed
if the evidence preponderates in favor of the finding;
nor, if the evidence thereon is evenly balanced or it is
doubtful where the preponderance lie$; nor, even if its
weight is slightly against the fidding of the trial
court, but it will be overturned and another finding
made only if the evidence clearly preponderates against
his finding. Nokes at 954.
The leniency of this standard of review has been explained, in
part, in terms of the deference that an Apellate court gives to
the trial court.

The validity of determinations made by the trial

court is supported by its opportunity to view the demeanor of
witnesses and hear the testimony first har^d.
Again, because the issues presented on appeal are questions
of fact (see discussion above), they receive very limited appellate review.

In effect, the findings of the trial court that
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Dakal and Diversified had actual notice, should only be reversed
upon a determination by the Supreme Court that said findings are
against the clear weight of the evidence.

(See also Jensen v.

Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981)).

IV.

EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OVERWHELMINGLY
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT
PLAINTIFFS DIVERSIFIED AND DAKAL ARE NOT
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS.

The protection provided to subsequent purchasers from prior
unrecorded interests is codified at Utah law in Section 57-1-6,
Utah Code Annotated (1953)f and also at Section 57-3-3, Utah Code
Annotated (1953).

(Said statutes are set out in full text in the

Addendum following the conclusion to Argument.)

Section 57-3-3

provides that prior unrecorded interests are defeated by subsequent purchasers in good faith for valuable consideration which
are first recorded.

Section 57-1-6 provides that prior unrecorded

interests succeed against subsequent purchasers, first recording,
who take with actual notice.

American concurs with the point made

in Appellants1 Brief at paqe 11 that the practical effect of the
statutes

is identical.

The synthesis of

these

statutes, as

applied to the present case, provides that American, whose interest was not of record at the time of the sale to Dakal and Diversified, will prevail unless Dakal and Diversified paid a valuable
consideration

and

took

the property

American1s interest.
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without

actual notice of

The term "actual notice," as it is used in the Utah statute,
is a term of art which
notice.

includes

the concept of constructive

A plethora of case law and legal authority supports this

proposition.

In 1923 the Supreme Court in the case of Lawley v.

Hickenlooper, 61 Utah 298, 212 Pac. 526 (1922) cited with approval
the following provision of 39 Cyc. 1703:
Notice to effect purchasers for value with charges on
property purchased may be actual or constructive.
There
is conflict in the cases and among writers as to what is
actual notice, but as actual and constructive notice are
the same in effect, it is immaterial which kind of
notice is received by the purchaser. Lawley at 530.
The

general

standard

for

determining

when

a

party

has

received actual notice is reiterated in Johnson v. Bell, supra.
[T]he "actual notice" required by ^Section 57-1-6 was
satisfied if a party dealing with th£ land had information of facts which would put a prudent man upon inquiry
and which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as
to the state of the title. Johnson at 310.
Not only is a party put on notice by information or facts suspicious in nature, but a party is charged with knowledge of all
facts and information that would have been! discovered upon a diligent inquiry.
Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put
the party on his guard and call for ijnquiry is notice of
everything to which such inquiry might have lead. When
a person has sufficient information to lead him to a
fact he shall be deemed conversant of it. McGarry v.
Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288,| 293 (194FT
When these standards are applied to the facts of the present
case, it is readily apparent that Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified
had actual knowledge of American's prior unrecorded interest.
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In light of the suspicious facts and circumstances that confronted Dakal and Diversified in the purchase of this property,
Plaintiffs were put on notice not only that American had an interest, but that its release of said interest was a mistake.

The

facts which Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified had in their possession prior to the time of sale are found at pages 19 to 23 of this
brief.

That compilation provides compelling evidentiary support

for the finding of the trial court that Diversified and Dakal
indeed had actual knowledge of American's interest.
Because of the complicated facts of this case as well as the
large number of parties involved, it is helpful at this point to
define the relationships of the parties and the consequences of
those relationships on the issue of actual notice.
Dakal and Diversified are separate entities.

Plaintiffs

However, Wayne Peck

is the principal of both entities (F. 23). All knowledge possessed by Wayne Peck, therefore, would also be attributable to both
Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified.
Brad Pentelute, a mortgage broker, acted as the agent of
Dakal and Wayne Peck throughout the transaction of the sale of
subject property from Third-party Defendant Rydalch to Plaintiff
Dakal (F.23).

Any knowledge or information that Mr. Pentelute

acquired during the course of the transaction may also be imputed
to Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified.

This imputed knowledge or

notice is based upon the proposition that knowledge gained by an
agent while acting in the scope of his agency is imputed to the
principal.

This principle was recognized by the Utah Supreme
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Court in FMA Financial Corporation v. Hanson Dairy Inc.y 617 P.2d
327, 329-330 (Utah 1980).

There, the lessor entrusted the hand-

ling of its interest in a transaction to an agent.

In subsequent

litigation with the lessee, the lessor was held responsible for
any knowledge possessed by the agent.

Therefore, it is clear that

Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified are charged with the knowledge
possessed by Mr. Peck or Mr. Pentelute concerning the sale of the
subject property.
Defendant American submits the following set of facts and
circumstances, drawn

from

the official

record

of

proceedings

before the trial court, to illustrate that Plaintiffs Dakal and
Diversified indeed had actual knowledge of American's interest in
the subject property.

Even though American contends that the

facts, as compiled here, present compelling evidence of the actual
knowledge of Plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal, it is important to
remember that the findings of the court need only find minimal
support in the facts.

(See Argument III).

If the present action is deemed an action at law, then the
decision of the trial court should be upheld upon a finding of any
competent evidence in support thereof.

\.f

deemed an action at

equity, then the trial court's decision should be upheld upon a
finding that the evidence does not clearly preponderate against
it.
1.

Mr. Rydalch

had

actual

knowledge

of American's

prior interest when he bought the subject property
in May of 1982:
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(a)

Rydalch's

warranty

deed

clearly

stated

an

indebtedness only to American and no other
lender (F. 7).
(b) When Rydalch purchased the subject property,
he

signed

an

Indemnification

and

Waiver

Agreement relating American (F. 9).
(c)

Buyers

Escrow

instructions

expressly stated

that the property was subject to American's
Trust

Deed

and

Non-Assumption

Agreement

(P. 8).
(d)

The

closing

officer

at

Stewart

Title

Co.

carefully explained that the property was subject to American's Deed of Trust (F. 12).
(e)

The title insurance policy prepared by Stewart
Title at the closing of the sale to Rydalch
clearly noted American's interest (and did not
show any interest of Beehive Thrift and Loan
Co.) (Defendant's Ex. 40 and F. 11).

2.

Plaintiffs had actual knowledge that Rydalch had
purchased

the

property

subject

to

the American

encumbrance,
(a)

Rydalch delivered the Stewart Title Insurance
policy

he

had

received

Pentelute (F. 27).
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at

closing

to Mr.

laintiff Dakal and Diversified had actual knowledge that Rydalch had not paid the outstanding debt
to American:
(a)

Mr. Pentelute

and

Mr. Peck

had

sufficient

knowledge to put them on inquiry or constructive notice of American's interest (F. 24).
(b)

Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified are held to
the knowledge that neither Rydalch nor anyone
else had paid American, a fact which clearly
would have been discovered on adequate inquiry
(F. 25).

Pentelute and Peck had knowlege that something was
wrong with Rydalch1s representation of unencumbered
fee simple ownership:
(a)

Pentelute and Peck were experts or had substantial
tressed

experience
properties

in
and

dealings
real

with

estate

dis-

trans-

actions in general (F. 27).
(b)

Pentelute and Peck knew that Rydalch had purchased subject to American's interest in May
of 1982 (F. 27).

(c)

Rydalch was willing to sell the property in
November or December of '82 for less than half
its market value (F. 26).

(d)

Rydalch, his attorney Burnett, and Pentelute
made repeated calls to American concerning the
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status of the account (T. 14, L. 1-8); (T. 18,
L. 15-20).
Additional facts illustrate that Plaintiffs Dakal
and

Diversified

had

actual

notice

of

American's

interest at the time of sale:
(a)

Plaintiff Dakal paid all of the closing costs
for the sale (F. 30) .

(b)

Wayne Peck paid a finders fee of $14,000 to
Mr. Pentelute

on the subject property which

was purchased for a sales price of $37,980 (F.
26).
(c)

Plaintiff Dakal sold the property to Plaintiff
Diversified

on the same day the

was closed with Rydalch.

transaction

Plaintiff Diversi-

fied paid $37,980 for the property and sold it
on the same day for $60,000.
The property was purchased for a price grossly disproportionate to the market value thereof:
(a)

Plaintiff Diversified purchased the property for $37,980 (F. 26).

(b)

Rydalch

estimated

the

property

to

be

worth $76,000 (T. 12, L. 2 ) .
(c)

Wayne Peck estimated the property to be
worth $70,000 to $75,000 (T. 19, L. 3 ) .
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(d) An appraisal done by Academy Appraisal
Associates in 1982 valued the property at
$103,000 as did the title insurance policy issued by Stewart Title

(F. 11 and

Defendant's Exhibit 40}.
Notice may be imputed from the mere fact that the sales price
was grossly disproportionate to the market value of the property.
It is well established in Utah law that a grossly disproportionate
sales price, of itself, may be enough to put a purchaser on notice
of a prior unrecorded interest.

In Lawley v. Hickenlooper, supra,

the Supreme Court cited with approval Section 39 Cyc 1718;
Where the contract under which the , purchaser buys is
sufficient on its face to put him on [inquiry as to what
consideration was or where it plainly shows consideration has not been paid or performed, he is chargeable
with notice thereof. A nominal or a grossly inadequate
consideration recited in a deed is a sufficient circumstance, for a reasonable time after such deed is made
and recorded, to put a purchaser or inquiry. Lawley at
530. (Emphasis added.)
The position adopted by the Utah court in Lawley is consistent with the position of the Restatement of the Law on Restitution.
The transfer is for value although the consideration is
of less value than the property transferred. The difference in value, however, may be evidence that the
transferee had notice that the transferor held the property subject to an equity in the favor of another.
Restatement of Restitution, Section 173, Comment b.
The foregoing evidence and facts submitted to the trial court
provide clear, persuasive and compelling support for the trial
court's finding that Plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal did have
actual notice of American's interest.
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The evidence, when viewed

as a whole, is unequivocally sufficient notice to "excite attention," and "put a prudent man upon inquiry."
As has been noted, evidence is considered sufficient to support a trial court's findings if it depicts circumstances sufficient to infer those findings.

(See Pixton v. Dunn, supra.) Rea-

sonable inferences drawn from the facts listed above clearly support the trial court's decision.

Therefore Dakal and Diversified

cannot be accorded the status of bona fide purchasers.
Common sense and the Plaintiff's knowledge of the real estate
market

would

undoubtedly

have

alerted

Plaintiffs

Dakal

and

Diversified to the irregularities regarding the subject property.
They knew that Rydalch had purchased
almost $60,000 worth of indebtedness.
would have paid American.

the property subject to
They knew that no one else

They knew that Rydalch, had he paid the

$60,000 indebtedness, would not be willing to sell the property
for $37,980.

They knew that Rydalch could not have paid $60,000

to American when he was unable to pay $20,000 to Holzer (Official
Record, p. 23).

They knew tha - a $60,000 encumbrance would not

disappear, in the space of six months, into thin air.

The repea-

ted phone calls and conversations concerning American's release of
its Trust Deed evidence that Plaintiffs were highly suspicious
about that transaction.

When the evidence is viewed as a whole

with the inferences that must logically be drawn therefrom, it is
clear that Plaintiffs Diversified and Dakal had actual notice of
American's interest and the mistake which had inadvertently been
made.
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V,

PLAINTIFFS DIVERSIFIED AND DAKAL DID NOT
SATISFY THEIR DOTY OF INQUIRY AND THEREFORE
CANNOT BE ACCORDED THE STATUS OF BONA FIDE
PURCHASERS.

Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified are charged with knowledge
of everything they could have discovered upon a diligent inquiry.
(See McGarry, supra.)

Plaintiffs contend that, being on actual n-

otice, they satisfied their duty of diligent inquiry.

In effect,

Plaintiffs argue that diligent inquiry would not have disclosed
American's outstanding interest.

This proposition can be analyzed

both factually and legally.

Plaintiffs' diligence in pursuing an

inquiry

by

will

be

analyzed

factually did and did not do.

examining

what

the

Plaintiffs

Legal analysis of the diligence of

Plaintiffs' inquiry will be made by comparing Plaintiffs actions
with the standard of diligence required by law.
First, what did Plaintiffs do?

Plaintiffs or their agent

Pentelute asked Rydalch if the loan had been paid.

His response

was that he had called American or his attorney Burnett had called
American and they had represented on repeated occasions that the
loan had been paid off.

Pentelute, Plaintiffs' agent, also made

one phone call to American concerning the status of the loan.

He

was informed, at that time, that the loan had been paid off.
Plaintiffs' also procured a title policy on the subject property
from Stewart Title Company which did not list the American encumbrance.

In summary, Plaintiffs relied on a series of four phone

calls made to American.

They relied on those representations even

though they could not remember with whom they had spoken. (Rydalch
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deposition, p. 61, L. 14). They also relied on the record title
reflected in the Stewart Title Insurance Policy.
What things did the Plaintiffs fail to do?

Plaintiffs clear-

ly avoided several inquiries which could have easily been made,
and which under the circumstances, should have been made.

In the

lengthy record before the trial court, Plaintiffs never alleged
that they attempted to ascertain who had paid American.

They

relied on the representations that the account was paid; even
though, they had actual knowledge that Rydalch had not paid it.
The true identity of the "phantom payor" could have easily been
ascertained had Plaintiffs attempted to do so.

In light of the

circumstances and the Plaintiffs knowledge that things were amiss,
these inquiries should have been made.
Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified

not only failed

to make

inquiry, but they failed to give any explanation why inquiry was
not made.

American hereby submits that Plaintiffs did not want to

know who had paid the outstanding loan amount; they did not want
to know because they realized that, in fact, no one had paid the
loan.

They knew or should have known that American had made a

mistake.

They failed

to use due diligence

in their

inquiry

because they intended to and did take advantage of that mistake.
A telling analogy can be drawn between the conduct of Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified and the conduct of a bank customer who
receives an over credit on his checking account.

Upon receiving a

monthly bank statement, the bank customer notes that his checking
account has been over credited by the amount of $10,000. The cus-
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tomer is positive that he has not deposited that amount.

During

the next few days the customer calls tne bank concerning his
checking account.

However, instead of notifying the bank that an

error has been made, the customer merely inquiries as to his
account balance.

The account balance, He is told, is $10,000.

Over the next couple of weeks the customed calls the bank several
more

times assuming

that the

error

would

balance, however, remains at $10,000.
inquiries,

has

the

customer

decides he has waited

During

inquired

deposited the amount in his account.

be detected.

as

to

The

none of these
who

might

have

At this point, the customer

long enough.

He goes to the bank, he

withdraws the money; and, he spends it.

A month passes and the

bank, inevitably, discovers the error.

JThe bank customer then

claims that not only was he not aware of the mistake, but he had
made adequate inquiry of the bank.
Just as that bank customer would not be allowed to retain the
benefits

of

the

bank's

error

of

whichl he

was

fully aware,

Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified should npt be allowed to retain
the

benefits

committed.

of

the

mistake

which

tqey

knew

American

had

As the Supreme Court stated in the case of Pender v.

Bird, 119 Utah 91, 224 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1950), " [T]he [recording]
statute was not enacted to protect one whose ignorance of the
title is deliberate and intentional."

|ln view of the highly

suspicious

their

facts

Plaintiffs

possessed,

reliance

on

the

representations of unnamed individuals and the title policy was
absolutely

unreasonable

and

in
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bad

f^ith.

A

quote

from

ADH^Iants' Brief is very appropriate in explaining that those who
are not honest in real estate transactions cannot claim to be bona
fide purchasers,
(4) "Good faith ordinarily exists where the purchase is
made with an honest purpose; good faith is absent where
ignorance of outstanding interests is deliberate and
intentionalf and it has been held that a want of caution
and deligence which an honest man of ordinary prudence
is accustomed to exercise ITT making purchases is, in
contemplation of law, a want of good faith."
77 Am,
Jur. 2d, Vendor & Purchaser, § 646, p. 761. (Appellants' Brief at p. 11.)
The legal standard concerning the adequacy of a purchaser's
inquiry cannot be distilled into a rigidite principle.

The vari-

ety of facts and circumstances that attend real estate transactions require that the legal standard be quite flexible.

There-

fore, a purchaser's inquiry would be adequate if it is prosecuted
with due diligence which is reasonable under the circumstances.

Where one has notice of a fact affecting property which
he seeks to purchase which puts him upon inquiry, he is
chargeable with knowledge which the inquiry, if made,
would have revealed; and one is put upon inquiry by
notice of a claim which is inconsistent with the title
he seeks to obtain, and must exercise due diligence to
ascertain the facts upon which the claim is based.
U.S. Fiduciary Corp., 675 P.2d 724 (Ariz. App. 1983).
Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified make much of the fact that
they purchased in reliance on the record title.
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Plaintiffs argue

that the trial court's decision establishes a dangerous precedent
in that purchasers would no longer be able to rely on record
title.

This argument is specious.

Upholding the decision of the

trial court in this case, in fact, establishes no new precedent at
all.

The unmistakable message of such a ruling would be that

purchasers may not blindly rely on record title when they have
actual notice of circumstances or facts which would require them
to make further inquiry.

That proposition was established by the

Supreme Court in 1950 in the case of Pender v.

Bird, supra.

The facts in Pender are very similar to those of the present
case.

There, the Plaintiff purchased a piece of property after

being advised of several suspicious circumstances surrounding the
transaction.

Even though the record title demonstrated that the

grantor was the owner of the property, the purchaser took with
notice that ownership was disputed.

Much like the present case,

the consideration paid for the purchase was grossly disporportionate to the value of the property.

Plaintiff then brought an

action to quiet title to the property as against Defendants who
claimed a prior unrecorded interest therein.

The Court flatly

rejected plaintiffs reliance on record title stating:
Plaintiff's claim that he relied on abstracts of title
in the office of the County Recorder, avails him nothing
in view of the fact that he was put on notice by his
grantor that the latter then had no title. . . . Unquestionably the Defendant knew that he was purchasing a
suspicious and speculative title for a sum hardly more
than sufficient to defray the cost of executing the
deed. Pender at 1059-1060.
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in light of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the sale
from Rydalch, Plaintiffs Dakal and Diversified should not be able
to assert the protection of record title.

In U.S. Fiduciary

Corporation v. Loma Vista Associates, supra, the Plaintiff asserted his reliance on record title and diligent inquiry.

Plaintiff

argued that his duty of inquiry was satisfied by the following
actions:

He examined all the documents in the chain of title;

visited two county offices to learn about zoning restrictions and
sewer connections; visited a title company to discuss the nature
and legal ramifications of the contract for sale of real estate;
and, he obtained a map which depicted the land which fell within
the three parcels.

The Court, however, found that the Plaintiff

was not a bona fide purchaser because he failed to ascertain who
the real owner of the property was when that issue was clearly in
doubt.

Plaintiff was not allowed to assert record title in the

face of his failure to take, what the court described
"simplist approach".

as the

Similarly, Plaintiffs1 reliance on record

title is patently unreasonable because they failed to make an adequate inquiry.

The fact that Plaintiffs called to inquire about

the account does not justify blind reliance on a representation
that they knew was erroneous.
CONCLUSION
The trial court, after hearing the testimony of the witnesses, and weighing the evidence, concluded
actual notice of American's interest.
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that Plaintiffs had

It is also implicit that

Plaintiffs, in fact, refused

to make an inquiry which would

have

avoided the entire problem.
The issues Plaintiffs present on appeal are questions or tact
and as such should receive minimal review.
when the appropriate standard of review
is applied
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Respectfully submitted this 17th day of January, 1985.

H. Mifflin'Williams III
CLYDE, PRATT, GIBBS & CAHOON
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
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ADDENDUM

OCA 57-1-6:

RECORDING NECESSARY TO IMPART NOTICE - OPERATION AND

EFFECT - INTEREST OF PERSON NOT NAMED IN INSTRUMENT Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing setting forth an agreement to convey any real estate or
whereby any real estate may be effected, to operate as notice to
third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and certified in the
manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of the
recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated, but
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto without
such proofs, acknowledgement, certification or record, and as to
all other persons who have had actual notice. Neither the fact
that an instrument, recorded as herein provided, recites only a
nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in such
instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or
stating the terms of the trust, shall operate to charge any third
person with a notice of interest of any person or persons not
named in such instrument or the grantor or grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as was conveyed to
him by such instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed
by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein provided
setting forth the names of the beneificiaries, specifying the
interest claimed in describing the property charged with such
interest.
OCA 57-3-3:

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RECORD -

Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made, which shall
not be recorded as provided in this title, shall be void as
against any subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable
consideration of the same real estate, or any portion thereof,
where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded.
ARTICLE VIII - SECTION 9, UTAH CONSTITUTION SECTION 9 [APPEALS FROM DISTRICT COURT - FROM JUSTICE
COURTS]
From all final judgments of the district courts, there shall
be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be
upon the record made in the Court below and under such regulations
as need be provided by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on
questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall
be on questions of law alone. Appeals shall also lie from the

final order and decrees of the court in the administration of
decedents estates, and in cases of guardianship, as shall be provided by law. Appeals shall also lie from the final judgment of
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the district
courts on both questions of law and fact, with such limitations
and restrictions as shall be provided by law; and the decisions of
the district court on such appeal shall be final, except in cases
involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute.
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